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1 Introduction
The debate over corporate tax coordination among international jurisdictions remains
unresolved. In particular, it has been argued that the member states of the European
Union should coordinate tax policies1 to avoid a “race to the bottom” that would un-
dermine their modern welfare states (Baldwin and Krugman, 2004). For this purpose,
in the 1990s, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
launched a “harmful tax competition” initiative. In addition, the United Nations (UN)
has called for the creation of an International Tax Organization, which would be specif-
ically charged with curtailing tax competition.
These concerns are in keeping with the large tax competition literature (for system-
atic reviews, see Wilson, 1999; Wilson and Wildasin, 2004; Boadway and Tremblay,
2011). The main point is that independent governments engage in wasteful compe-
tition2 over scarce capital through inefficiently low tax rates and public expenditure
levels. Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986) have formally modeled
this process.
The literature highlights two coordination devices designed to correct the inefficien-
cies3 caused by tax competition: tax harmonization and the imposition of a minimum
tax rate. Tax harmonization is generally understood as a transition towards a common
1The Ruding Report (1992) made several far-reaching harmonization proposals related to corporate
taxation, including the imposition of an EU-wide minimum corporate tax rate (Haufler, 1999).
2Other existing studies concern welfare-improving tax competition. From the public choice per-
spective, Brennan and Buchanan (1980) argue that tax competition reduces the size of excessively large
governments and improves welfare. Rouscher (1998) and Edwards & Keen (1996) formalize the notion
by including tax competition in various Leviathan models. Another strand of the literature has been
motivated by Tiebout (1956), who was the first to investigate the notion that competition between juris-
dictions may promote efficiency if households are able to sort themselves into jurisdictions composed of
individuals with similar preferences and receive public goods tailored to their incomes and preferences.
However, this is not our focus.
3The existing literature suggests other ways of coordination. Wildasin (1989) suggest that central
governments can provide regions with a ‘corrective subsidy’, while Boadway and Flatters (1982) discuss
intergovernmental transfers when facing inefficiencies due to tax competition.
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rate structure (Keen, 1987; Zissomos and Wooders, 2008).
More specifically, in the present paper, we define tax harmonization as the equal-
ization of tax rates, which is consistent with the tax competition literature (see, for
example, Kanbur and Keen, 1993; Baldwin and Krugman, 2004; Zissimos and Wood-
ers, 2008) and common policy prescriptions4. The general conclusion of the classical
literature is that appropriately selected uniform tax rates improve efficiency relative
to tax competition. The reason is that an upward harmonization of capital tax rates
can produce a Pareto improvement (Baldwin and Krugman, 2004). This conclusion
also holds when the competing countries are asymmetric in size (Kanbur and Keen,
1993).5 Another type of coordination is the adoption of a minimum tax rate that allows
some room for tax competition. An interesting result highlighted in the literature (see
Keen and Konrad, 2012) is that the imposition of a minimum tax rate can be Pareto-
improving for all partner countries.
Many authors argue that jurisdictions not only compete in taxes but also in in-
frastructure (for example, Hindriks et al., 2008; Zissimos and Wooders, 2008; Just-
man et al., 2002, and Pieretti and Zanaj, 2011).6 Moreover, recent empirical research
(Hauptmeier et al., 2012) demonstrates that jurisdictions use independent and strate-
gic business tax rates and public inputs to compete for capital. However, the existing
literature on the desirability of tax coordination is primarily based on the assumption
4In 2003, the EU Council adopted a voluntary Code of Conduct to combat harmful tax competition,
and more ambitious proposals for corporate tax harmonization have been advanced, including the in-
troduction of a single EU corporate tax (Conconi et al., 2008).
5Kanbur and Keen (1993) show that there exists a critical level above which harmonization results
in tax revenue exceeding, for each jurisdiction, that of the non-cooperative equilibrium. However, a
uniform level between the Nash equilibrium rates is certain to harm the small country.
6Some authors (Keen and Marchand, 1997 and Fuest, 1995) consider the impact of public inputs
on the production function of firms and thus account for the effect of infrastructure on internationally
mobile capital. However, in these models tax rates and infrastructure expenditures are not independent
variables. This results formally from the fact that tax rates and infrastructure expenditures are linked
through a balanced budget. According to Wildasin (1991), equilibria in fiscal competition games with
two instruments related via a budget constraint crucially depend on which instrument is set strategically.
Consequently, if countries interact in taxes, expenditures are not a strategic variable.
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that countries solely strategically compete in tax rates. However, an exception is Zis-
simos and Wooders (2008). These authors alternatively consider minimum taxation
and tax harmonization as coordination devices. Governments are supposed to simul-
taneously set their tax levels subject to the constraints imposed by policy coordination
for given levels of public goods fixed at the non-cooperative equilibrium. However,
why would jurisdictions not adapt their infrastructure expenditures to the new envi-
ronment caused by tax coordination when these expenditure levels are no longer their
best choices? Maintaining a given level of infrastructure expenditures would not be
rational. It would also drastically limit sovereign policy making, as many infrastruc-
ture expenditures primarily satisfy internal policy goals and are incidentally attractive
to foreign investments. To account for this issue, we assume that tax coordination
does not constrain infrastructure competition among sovereign jurisdictions. In other
words, jurisdictions still compete in infrastructure, though they may coordinate their
taxes.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the desirability of tax coordination when
two heterogeneous jurisdictions compete for mobile entrepreneurs using taxes and in-
frastructure investments that improve firm productivity. These infrastructure invest-
ments may represent material or immaterial public goods such as laws and regula-
tions protecting intellectual property and specifying accurate dispute resolution rules.
We thus model two-dimensional strategic interactions within a game-theoretical ap-
proach. Furthermore, firms are assumed to be heterogeneous in their preferences or
their ability to relocate abroad. The model also accounts for two real-world charac-
teristics, asymmetries in both country size7 and institutional quality. Various authors
have addressed the importance of size asymmetries in tax competition (Bucovetsky,
1991; Wilson, 1991; Kanbur and Keen, 1993), but the role of institutional differences
across jurisdictions has been neglected. It is also generally recognized that a coun-
try’s institutional environment impacts its economic performance. The reason is that
7Country size may be defined by population, area, or national income (Streeten, 1993). In this study,
population, rather than area, is used to denote country size. More precisely, size is defined with respect
to the number of capital owners residing in a country.
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the quality of the existing institutional framework in which activity takes place sig-
nificantly shapes the business environment8. Indeed, nations endowed with higher
quality institutions provide firms with better auditing and judicial systems and offer
more efficient property rights protection and enforcement9. In our model, we assume
that a country’s institutional environment translates into territory-specific productiv-
ity conditions that are shared by all firms located in a given jurisdiction, independent
of their countries of origin.10
The main results may be summarized as follows. When tax revenue is used to
gauge whether tax coordination dominates a non-cooperative equilibrium, the follow-
ing results are obtained. If the jurisdictions decide to set uniform tax rates, coordina-
tion is Pareto-inferior to the non-cooperative equilibrium when countries compete in
tax and non-tax instruments. By contrast, if jurisdictions only compete in taxes, our
model indicates that tax harmonization can be Pareto-improving. Coordination con-
sisting of the imposition of a lower bound on tax rates only increases the revenue of the
high tax country if jurisdictions compete in taxes and infrastructure. In other words,
the low tax country will never be better off, and the revenue loss increases in the weak-
ness of its institutions. However, if inter-jurisdictional tax redistribution is feasible, it is
conceivable that the country incurring a tax loss could be compensated if coordination
increases joint revenue. We show, however, that for a range of minimum rate choices,
compensation is not feasible. These results are at odds with the classical outcome that
imposing an appropriate minimum rate improves the revenue of each country when
jurisdictions simultaneously compete in taxes alone (see Keen and Konrad, 2012).11
8La Porta et al. (2000) argue that countries have varying abilities to offer investors an attractive
institutional environment. According to Acemoglu et al. (2001), institutions positively influence per
capita GDP.
9Besley (1995) and Johnson et al. (2002) argue that strong property rights are attractive to investment.
10Hindriks et al. (2008) also consider a model with uneven productivity levels across two regions that
compete in taxes and public inputs to attract capital. However, they do not consider tax coordination.
11Our result is however consistent with Konrad (2009) who analyzes minimum tax coordination
within a sequential tax game where firms compete à la Stackelberg. In this case, coordination drives
down the revenue of the follower, which is the low tax country, and increases the leader’s revenue.
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The results differ when we consider the potential welfare gains from tax coordination.
When the jurisdictions decide to set uniform tax rates, the profitability of coordination
crucially depends on the degree of inter-country asymmetry. In particular, if countries
are symmetric in population size but have very unequally developed institutions, tax
harmonization will be less efficient than tax and infrastructure competition. However,
this result is reversed if countries have equal institutional quality and are sufficiently
similar in size. Finally, our model demonstrates that minimum tax coordination always
increases social welfare.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we model tax and
infrastructure competition between heterogeneous jurisdictions that attempt to attract
imperfectly mobile firms. Section 3 analyzes the conditions under which tax harmo-
nization is more desirable than tax and infrastructure competition. Section 4 examines
the differences between minimum tax coordination and tax competition. Section 5 con-
cludes.
2 The model
Consider two jurisdictions denoted h and f . The countries’ populations are evenly
distributed with unit density on a segment [0; 1]. Country h is assumed to be small in
terms of total population, and its size is given by S with 0 < S < 1
2
. It follows that
the size of country f equals 1
2
< 1   S < 1. Similar to Pieretti and Zanaj (2011), we
assume that each individual owns one unit of capital and is simultaneously an entre-
preneur and a worker. In other words, each member of the population corresponds to
a one-person company12. The entrepreneurs can relocate their activity abroad, but we
assume (see Ogura, 2006) that they are heterogeneous in their preferences regarding re-
location. The entrepreneurs are thus ranked according to their willingness to relocate
12It follows that the world population coincides with the population of firms. We could assume that
each firm is run by more than one person, but this would unnecessarily complicate the model without
providing further insights.
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abroad13. The closer an individual is to the border separating countries h and f , the
easier it is for her to relocate abroad. In other words, an entrepreneur of type  2 [0; 1]
who moves abroad incurs a mobility cost equal to j   Sj, which is the ”distance”
between the border S and an entrepreneur of type .
Firms
Using one unit of capital, each individual living in country j (j = h; f) is able to
produce yj = qj + j units of one final good. The parameter qj (j = h; f) represents
firm specific productivity, whereas j is the output fraction, which is country-specific.
More precisely, we write j = 0j + j , where 
0
j is a state parameter describing the
institutional environment in country j and j is the level of infrastructure spending
planned by the policy-makers in country j. In other words, the quality of institutions
and infrastructure results from history and current decisions.
The focus of the paper is on how uneven institutional quality and infrastructure
expenditures affect the welfare effects of tax competition. Therefore, we assume that
firm-specific productivity is uniform across firms, which means that qj = q (j = h; f).
For simplicity, we normalize 0h = 1 and consider 
0
f = a
0
h = a  0, where ratio a
reflects the difference in institutional quality between the two economies. The ratio
can be equal to one (the two economies are equal in quality), larger than one (the small
economy has poorer institutional quality) or smaller than one (the large economy has
poorer institutional quality). Finally, we assume that the final goods are sold in a com-
petitive market with a price normalized to one. The unit cost of production is assumed
to be constant and normalized to zero.
A firm of type x 2 [0; S] with home country h is indifferent between producing at
13As in Ogura (2006), we assume that this population of entrepreneurs is heterogeneous in the degree
of their attachment to the home country. The sources of this home bias can be different. For example,
transferring activities abroad requires substantial information, which may differ across entrepreneurs.
Another cause can be linked to material relocation costs, which can be specific to each firm.
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home and in the foreign country f if
qh + h   th = qf + f   tf   (S   x) ; (1)
where th and tf are source-based tax rates levied on capital in countries h and f , re-
spectively.
Similarly, a firm of type x 2 [S; 1] located in country f is indifferent between invest-
ing at home and investing abroad if
qf + f   tf = qh + h   th   (x  S): (2)
The above two conditions yield
x = (1  a) + (h   f ) + (tf   th) + S: (3)
Note that if x > S; firms move from the large to the small country, while if x < S; firms
move from the small country to its larger rival.
Governments
We now assume that countries attempt to attract companies by competing in taxes
and public infrastructure that enhance private productivity. Jurisdictions h and f are
thus able to influence the productivity parameter j (j = h; f) of the firms located
within their respective boundaries. As in Hindriks et al. (2008) and Pieretti and Zanaj
(2011), we assume that one additional unit of the public good produces one additional
unit of the private good. It follows that j also represents the amount of the public
good supplied by jurisdiction j (j = h; f). The cost of providing this public good in
each country j is given by the quadratic cost function C(j) = 12
2
j . Each jurisdiction
j (j = h; f) is assumed to maximize its total tax revenue14, net of public expenditures,
by selecting the appropriate tax rate tj and infrastructure level j . The governments’
objective functions are given by
Bh = thx  1
2
2h; Bf = tf (1  x) 
1
2
2f : (4)
14For a similar assumption, see Kanbur and Keen (1993), Zissimos and Wooders (2008) or Pieretti and
Zanaj (2011). By so doing, we do not assume that jurisdictions are self-interested governments. We
simply assume that collected taxes are used to finance public goods in the interest of their populations.
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We now assume that the two jurisdictions wish to attract productive capital by
competing in taxes and infrastructure. To this end, we consider a two-stage game15.
First, the governments non-cooperatively select infrastructure levels. Then, they set
the tax rates. Finally, firms decide where to locate their production processes. We solve
the game by backward induction.
Beginning from the second stage, each government maximizes its objective with
respect to its tax rate while taking its rival’s rate as given. The first order conditions16
yield the following unique equilibrium tax rates
th =
1  a+ (1 + S)  f + h
3
; (5)
tf =
a  1 + (2  S) + f   h
3
:
It follows that the number of companies located in countries h and f are, respec-
tively, x and 1  x, with
x =
1  a+ (1 + S) + h   f
3
:
After substituting the above tax rates into the jurisdictions’ objective functions, we
can solve for stage 1 of the game, where the two governments compete in public in-
frastructure h and f . It is simple to verify that the objective function Bj (j = h; f )
is strictly concave in j (j = h; f ). The first order conditions thus lead to the unique
equilibrium expenditures
h =
2
15
(4  3a+ 3S); f =
2
15
(1 + 3a  3S): (6)
Introducing (6) into (5) yields the equilibrium values
th =
3
2
h ; t

f =
3
2
f : (7)
15The choice of sequentiality follows from the rule that the most irreversible decision must be made
first.
16The second order conditions can be easily verified.
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Therefore, the strategy-tuple
 
h; 

f ; t

h; t

f

is a unique subgame perfect Nash equi-
librium.
Equation (7) shows that the country that taxes more than its rival also provides
more public infrastructure.
The number of firms located in equilibrium in country h is given by
x =
1
5
(4  3a+ 3S): (8)
It is straightforward to show that x 2 [0; 1] and j  0(j = h; f) if a 2
 
S   1
3
; S + 4
3

.
The tax differential between the large and small countries equals
tf   th =
3
2
 
f   h

=
3
5
(a  a) ; where a = 1
2
+ S: (9)
According to (9), it follows that tf > t

h if a 2
 
a; S + 4
3

, and th > t

f if a 2
 
S   1
3
; a

.
The intuition underlying equation (9) is best understood if we suppose that countries
would share the same institutional environment (a = 1). In this case, we obtain the
standard result that the smallest country sets the smallest tax rate. If we now assume
that the small country has the best institutional environment, it will be able to increase
its tax rate. Consequently, competition will equalize the tax rates across jurisdictions if
the small country’s institutional quality is high enough. This is precisely the case when
a = a. In other words, a is the level of institutional disparity that exactly compensates
for the effect of asymmetric size on inter-jurisdictional tax differences. If countries are
equal in size (S = 1
2
), the level of a equals 1.
But if country h becomes smaller relative to f (S decreases), the compensation level
of institutional quality of country h has to increase relative to f . Therefore, a decreases
with S. Finally we can say that the larger the gap ja  aj ; the more the competing
jurisdictions differentiate themselves.
The equilibrium tax revenues of both countries are
Bh =
7
225
(4  3a+ 3S)2 and Bf =
7
225
(1 + 3a  3S)2 : (10)
10
Therefore, the joint tax revenue isB = Bh+B

f . As in Zissimos and Wooders (2008),
we define efficiency as the maximum level of surplus available to all individuals in the
two economies
W (x) = (h + f ) + (Bh +Bf ) 
Z jxT Sj
0
ydy: (11)
The two terms in the brackets include, respectively, the total firms’ profits17 and to-
tal tax revenues. The last term is the relocation cost faced by relocating companies.
After simplification, the (joint) social welfare W  resulting from inter-jurisdictional
competition equals
W  =
"
q + (1 + h)x
 +
 
a+ f

(1  x) 
 


h
2
2
 
 


f
2
2
#
 
Z jx Sj
0
ydy: (12)
The sum of the terms included in brackets is the global output and the second term
is the total mobility cost of firms.
Plugging the equilibrium values of h; 

f , and x into (12) yields
W  = q +
1
450
[333a2   18a(37S + 6) + 18S(6S + 31) + 352]: (13)
It is convenient to show that W  > 0 for all a 2  S   1
3
; S + 4
3

with S 2  0; 1
2

.
3 Harmonization versus tax competition
We now assume that the two countries cooperatively select uniform tax rates, for a
given level of infrastructure expenditures. Therefore, they only compete in infrastruc-
ture. We further assume that the uniform tax rate is designed to maximize either global
17The profit in country j (j = h; f ) is j = (q + j   tj)xj .
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tax revenue or global social welfare. The two cases will be considered successively.
Then, we analyze the conditions under which harmonization is desirable, successively
applying the tax revenue and social welfare perspectives.
3.1 Tax harmonization
We define the uniform tax rate as follows:
th = tf = t; t  0:
Therefore, the number of firms that locate in the small country is given by
x = (1  a) + (h   f ) + S:
We first solve the infrastructure game. Each jurisdiction selects a level of public
infrastructure j by maximizing its revenue for a given tax rate t.
In equilibrium, we obtain
uh = 
u
f = t:
It follows that
xu = (1  a) + S:
If institutional quality is higher in the small country ( 1 > a) it attracts xu   S firms
from its large rival. Otherwise, (1 < a), S   xu firms leave the small country. Because
xu 2 [0; 1], we impose a 2 [S; 1 + S]:
The tax revenues of countries h and f resulting from infrastructure competition for
a given uniform tax rate is as follows
Buh = t ((1  a) + S) 
1
2
t2 and Buf = t(a  S) 
1
2
t2: (14)
Joint tax revenue becomes
Bu(t) = Buh +B
u
f = t (1  t) ; (15)
12
where Bu(t) is positive if t 2 (0; 1).
The aggregate social welfare resulting from infrastructure competition with uni-
form tax rates is
W u = q +

a2   (1 + S) a+ (1 + S + t (1  t))  1
2
(1  a)2 : (16)
Given that t 2 (0; 1) and S 2  0; 1
2

, W u is always positive.
We are now able to calculate the harmonized tax rate. First consider the case where
the jurisdictions agree on a uniform rate that maximizes joint tax revenue. It is easy to
see that t = arg maxBu(t) = 1
2
. It follows that B
u
= Bu(t) = 1
4
, Buh(t) =
1
8
(4S   4a+ 3)
andBuf (t) =
1
8
(4a  4S   1). If tax harmonization is intended to maximize global social
welfare we show that ts = arg maxW (t) = 1
2
. The resulting maximum social welfare
equals W (ts) = 1
4
[4S (1  a) + 2a2 + 3].
3.2 Comparing tax revenues
In this section we analyze the desirability of tax harmonization with respect to tax rev-
enues. Comparing tax revenues resulting from tax and infrastructure competition with
the maximum revenue resulting from tax harmonization shows that Bh > B
u
h(t) and
Bf > B
u
f (t) for all a 2 [S; 1 + S] and all S 2 (0; 12). In other words, if the common
rate equals t, tax harmonization does not make both countries better off. The intuition
underlying this result can be explained as follows. As in (Hindriks et al., 2008), our
model implies that the more jurisdictions improve their attractiveness by investing in
infrastructure in the current period, the fiercer tax competition will be in the second
stage. The competing jurisdictions anticipate this effect in the first stage and thus un-
derinvest in infrastructure relative to the tax harmonization scenario. This last case
reduces to a one-stage game without strategic interaction between taxes and public in-
vestments. As a result, tax revenue net of infrastructure expenditures is lower under
tax harmonization option.
The above finding is at odds with classical results, according to which tax harmo-
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nization dominates pure tax competition if the uniform tax rate is sufficiently high (see
for example, Kanbur and Keen, 1993; Baldwin and Krugman, 2004 and Boadway and
Tremblay, 2011). Our model leads to a similar conclusion (see Appendix A) if we re-
strict ourselves to pure tax competition with symmetric institutional quality by setting
a = 1and h = f = 0. Indeed, in that case, tax harmonization generates more revenue
than tax competition for both jurisdictions provided that the two countries are not ex-
cessively asymmetric with respect to size. However, if revenue transfers are feasible,
both countries are always better off under an appropriate common rate.
We can now state the following proposition
Proposition 1 Moving from tax and infrastructure competition to tax harmonization de-
creases the tax revenues of all competing countries. However, if the countries compete in taxes
only, harmonization can be Pareto-improving in tax revenue.
3.3 Comparing social welfare
Now we use social welfare to gauge the desirability of tax harmonization. To this end,
consider the difference
W   W (ts) = Aa2 +Ba+ C;
where A = 6
25
; B =   6
25
(1 + 2S) and C = 1
900
(216S + 216S2 + 29). It is straightforward
to show that W  < W (ts) if a 2 (a1; a2) ; where18 a1 = a  536
p
6 and a2 = a+ 536
p
6 and
W  > W (ts) if a 2 (S; a1) or a 2 (a2; 1 + S). It follows that harmonization dominates
tax competition as long as the difference in institutional quality across countries is
not too distant from a. Recall that the larger the gap between a and a; the more the
competing jurisdictions are differentiated from a tax perspective. In the same vein,
countries will be considered similar from a tax perspective if a = a.
To explain in detail what happens, we can decompose the welfare difference W   
W (ts) in the following manner
18It can be shown that a1 and a2 respectively satisfy the conditions S < a1 and a2 < 1 + S.
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W   W (ts) = B + ; (17)
where B = (Bh +B

f )  [Bh(ts) +Bf (ts)] and  = (h + f )  [h(ts) + f (ts)]. From
the previous section, we know that the movement from interjurisdictional competition
to harmonization decreases net joint tax revenue (B > 0 for all a). However, it can
readily be shown that the same change of regime increases joint profits (net of moving
costs) ( < 0 for all a). However, the opposite signs of B and  have a common
cause. Indeed, inter-state competition generates more tax revenue than harmonization
but less infrastructure expenditures. This benefits the governments and, by the same
token, hurts the private economy. Which of the two effects will dominate depends19
on the value of a. Indeed, it is convenient to show that B +  < 0 if a 2 (a1; a2)
and B +  > 0 if a =2 (a1; a2). To explain the intuition underlying this result, note
that B increases more rapidly than   when a moves away from a (see Figure
1). When a deviates from a to a greater extent, the competing jurisdictions become in-
creasingly different and tax competition becomes less intense. Consequently, joint tax
revenue increases at a faster pace than infrastructure expenditures. Less intense inter-
jurisdictional competition makes taxpayers more captive but decreases the importance
of infrastructure attractiveness. At the governmental level, tax receipts increase more
rapidly than infrastructure expenditures, and from the firms’ perspective, the produc-
tivity induced by public expenditures grows more slowly than tax payments. Two
cases can then be considered.
a) When a 2 (a1; a2) ; the competing jurisdictions are not too different and tax har-
monization is the most preferable option from the social perspective. Tax payers are
then moderately captive relative to the importance of infrastructure attractiveness. As
a result (see Figure 1), the relative gain induced by tax and infrastructure competition is
not sufficiently high to compensate for the benefit of tax harmonization (B <  ).
b) When the institutional gap between the competing countries is sufficiently large,
19More exactly, we have B = 1425a
2 +  1425 (1 + 2S)a+ 1900
 
504S + 504S2 + 251

and  =   825a2 +
8
25a(1 + 2S)  1150
 
48S + 48S2 + 37

:
15
i.e., a 2 (S; a1) [ (a2; 1 + S), tax harmonization is no more the most efficient option.
Tax competition has become less intense, and taxing captive firms is relatively more
beneficial than providing infrastructure. Accordingly, the relative benefit of tax and
infrastructure competition (B) increases to such an extent that it exceeds (see Figure
1) the benefit of harmonization ( ).
Figure 1
As a corollary to the above analysis, if countries are symmetric in size and have
equally developed institutions20, tax harmonization always dominates tax and infrastruc-
ture competition. However, if we consider asymmetric size while still supposing uni-
form institutional development, the result can be reversed. Indeed, tax and infrastruc-
ture competition is more efficient than tax harmonization (W  > W (ts)) if the size S of
the small country is smaller than bS = 1
2
  5
36
p
6: This last finding does not appear if
we restrict ourselves to pure tax competition. Indeed, our model shows (see Appen-
dix A) that moving from tax competition to tax harmonization always improves social
20This assumption is generally taken for granted in the tax competition literature.
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welfare if h = f = 0 and a = 1.
The following proposition concludes
Proposition 2
(a) If countries have equally developed institutions and are symmetric in size, tax harmo-
nization is more efficient than tax and infrastructure competition. This result is, however,
reversed if the countries’ sizes are sufficiently asymmetric.
(b) If countries have unequal institutional quality, harmonization can be less efficient than
tax and infrastructure competition. This result arises if the competing jurisdictions are
sufficiently differentiated.
4 Minimum tax versus tax competition
We now assume that the jurisdictions agree on a minimum tax rate  which is in be-
tween the tax rates resulting from tax and infrastructure competition. This option has
been analyzed by some authors (see, for example, Kanbur and Keen, 1993). We showed
above that a > a implies th < t

f : Thus, the minimum tax rate  will be  > t

h. However,
when a < awe have th > t

f and thus  > t

f . In the following, we only analyze in detail
the case where th < t

f , as the conclusions we derive still hold for the alternative case.
4.1 Competition with a minimum tax rate
We now assume that the jurisdictions first compete in infrastructure expenditures and
then in tax rates, which are bounded from below. As we assume that a > a , the non-
cooperative tax rate of the small country will be the lower bound ( > th). We know
that the objective function Bh(th) is concave in th. Consequently, the small country
chooses its best tax rate, which is toh () =  . If the common lower bound  is higher
17
than tf , the large country will also set t
o
f () =  , and we recover the case of harmo-
nization. Thus, we assume that th <  < t

f . The large country then chooses the tax rate
tof [t
o
h ()] that is its best response to t
o
h () . Solving the game backwardly, we first ana-
lyze tax competition for a given level of infrastructure expenditures and then consider
infrastructure competition. The solution of the game yields the following subgame
perfect equilibrium values
oh =

2
; of = a  S +

2
; (18)
toh =  ; t
o
f = a  S +

2
: (19)
The share of firms that locate in the small country is xo = S a  1
2
+1. As x 2 [0; 1],
we impose  < m = 2(1   a + S), which requires that a < 1 + S. Furthermore, to
guarantee that m > th, we impose a <
6
7
+ S. Therefore, in the sequel we assume that
 2 [th;minftf ; mg] and a 2
 
1
2
+ S; 6
7
+ S

.
The tax revenue of the small and the large countries are, respectively, Boh = (1  a+
S)   5
8
 2, and Bof =
1
8
(2a  2S + )2.
The joint tax revenue becomes
Bo = Boh +B
o
f (20)
=
1
2
[(a  S)2 + (2  a+ S)    2]:
The equilibrium social welfare resulting from the above equilibrium is
W o = q + a2   2aS + 1
8
[4S(2 + S) + (4  3) + 4]: (21)
4.2 Comparing tax revenue and social welfare
Tax revenue
We first analyze whether tax coordination, by imposing a minimum tax rate, in-
creases the tax revenues of the competing countries. To this end, we compare for each
18
country j (j = h; f ) the difference Bj   Boj . In Appendix B (claims 1 and 2), we show
that for a > a we obtain Bh > B
o
h and B
o
f > B

f : In other words, imposing a lower
bound on tax rates does not unanimously improve the revenues of both coordinating
countries. Indeed, it appears that the lower tax country21 loses tax revenue by moving
from a non-cooperative equilibrium to minimum tax coordination. Consequently, ac-
counting for the fact that countries can, in addition to tax competition, also compete
simultaneously in infrastructure qualifies a classical result (see Kanbur and Keen, 1993)
according to which imposing a minimum tax rate Pareto-improves the countries’ tax
revenues (see Appendix A).
However, if coordination improves joint revenue, the winner could possibly com-
pensate the loser and each country could thus be made better off. Therefore let us
analyze whether a joint revenue improvement ( Bo > B) is possible. In Appendix
B (claim 3), we show that B > Bo if and only if  2  th;minf ; tfg which is only
possible for a 2 (a;am) where am = 5
p
3 3
9
+ S. In other words, for certain minimum
rate choices, there is no room for compensation if the institutional quality of the high
tax country is sufficiently high. The following figure illustrates the just described con-
ditions. If the minimum tax rate is included in the grey area, we have B > Bo and
Bo > B in the yellow area. Note that the figure merges the case where a > a with the
one where a < a for which we did not provide calculations because the two cases are
symmetric.
21Note that the lower tax country is the small one if a > a, but it will be the large country if a < a.
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Figure 2
We just showed that, for a given level of institutional quality, moving from a non-
cooperative situation to the imposition of a minimum tax rate reduces the revenue of
the low tax country. Does this loss increase with reduced institutional quality? In other
words, when the losing country is h, does the difference Bh   Boh increase with a? It is
straightforward to show22 that @
@a
(Bh  Boh) > 0. Therefore, the more the low tax coun-
try is institutionally underdeveloped, the more it will lose by moving from competition
to minimum tax coordination. If countries are equal in size (S = 1
2
); we observe that
the country with the less developed institutions23 will lose under the imposition of a
minimum tax rate.
22Indeed, we show that @@a (B

h  Boh) = 1425 [(a   S)   43 ] +  > 1425
 
x  43

+ th, with x = a   S and
x 2   12 ; 67. As th = 4 3x5 , we can write @@a (Bh  Boh) = 475   125x. This last expression is decreasing in x.
Therefore, @@a (B

h  Boh) > 0 for all x 2
 
1
2 ;
6
7

as it is positive for the highest value of x.
23Note that low institutional development is generally associated with economic underdevelopment.
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Social welfare
In Appendix B (claim 4), we show that moving from a non-cooperative equilibrium
to minimum tax coordination always increases social welfare.
The following proposition can now be stated
Proposition 3
(a) Moving from tax and infrastructure competition to minimum tax coordination has oppo-
site effects on the jurisdictions’ tax revenues. The high tax country’s revenue is improved,
while the low tax country is made worse off.
(b) If the institutional quality of the high tax country is not sufficiently high, there is no
scope for compensating the loser, even if a compensation mechanism exists.
(c) Moving from tax and infrastructure competition to minimum tax coordination always
increases social welfare.
5 Conclusion
The purpose of the paper is to investigate whether tax coordination is desirable when
countries compete in taxes and infrastructure. To address this question, we develop
a model where governments strategically select tax rates and the level of public ex-
penditures to maximize net tax revenues. In addition to asymmetric size, the model
incorporates asymmetric institutional quality, which has been largely ignored in the tax
competition literature. The desirability of tax coordination is then separately analyzed
through its impact on tax revenue and social welfare.
Our results are in stark contrast to the findings of the pure tax competition liter-
ature. This is particularly relevant for policy issues because the belief that tax com-
petition generally causes the "erosion of national tax bases" may prove erroneous if
countries compete in tax and non-tax instruments. Indeed, in our two-country model
21
we show that a uniform tax causes a tax loss to each country and that imposing a min-
imum tax rate only hurts the low tax jurisdiction. These results are however strongly
contrasted if jurisdictions only compete in taxes.
It is also worth noting that asymmetries in size and institutional quality play an
important role in gauging the desirability of tax coordination. For example, we show
that tax harmonization is less efficient than tax and infrastructure competition if the
competing countries are equal in size but have very different levels of institutional
development.
If we focus on international institutional disparities, which often reflect uneven eco-
nomic development, our model demonstrates that tax coordination is harmful to the
less developed jurisdiction which is also the low tax one.24 This begs the following
question. Can tax and infrastructure competition be a way for lagging countries to
catch-up in terms of economic development? Future research could address this ques-
tion by employing a dynamic version of our model. This would allow to investigate
under which conditions tax and infrastructure competition could, in the long run, pro-
mote convergence across unequally developed countries.
24Assuming that the countries are of equal size.
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A Pure tax competition
In the case of pure tax competition with symmetric institutional quality (a = 1), we
have h = f = 0: Solving the tax game yields the equilibrium rates of countries h
and f , which are respectively tTh =
1
3
(1 + S) and tTf =
1
3
(2   S). The corresponding
countries’ tax revenues are BTh =
1
9
(S + 1)2 =
 
xT
2 and BTf = 19 (2  S)2 =  1  xT 2.
The joint tax income is thus BT = 1
9
(2S2   2S + 5).
A.1 Tax harmonization
The impact on tax revenues
If both countries opt for tax harmonization, the uniform tax rate can equal any value
tu 2 [0; 1]. As a result, xu = S companies will be located in the small country and 1 
xu in the large economy. The tax revenues of the two countries are then respectively
Buh = t
uS and Buf = t
u(1   S). The joint maximal revenue is Bu = Buh + Buf = tu. It is
now convenient to show thatBu > BT ; if t 2 [5
9
; 1] for all S 2 (0; 1
2
): It implies that if the
unified tax rate is higher than 5
9
, tax harmonization generates higher total tax revenue
than pure tax competition. This is consistent with the tax competition literature (see
for example, Kanbur and Keen, 1993; Baldwin and Krugman, 2004 and Boadway and
Tremblay, 2011).
We now consider each country individually. For the large country we can easily
show that Buf > B
T
f for S 2
 
0; 1
2

and t 2 [ (2 S)2
9(1 S) ; 1]. In the same way we can show
for the small country that Buh > B
T
h for all S 2
 
7
2
  3
2
p
5; 1
2

and t 2 [ (1+S)2
9S
; 1]. In
other words, if the competing economies are not too uneven in size, the presence of
a uniform tax rate, which is high enough, leads to a Pareto-improvement in tax rev-
enue. Moreover, each country can be made better off for any S 2  0; 1
2

, by imposing a
uniform tax rate t 2 [5
9
; 1], if inter-jurisdictional revenue redistribution is feasible.
The impact on social welfare
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If tax rates are the same across jurisdictions, the social welfare equals W u = q:
The aggregate welfare resulting from pure tax competition is W T = q   1
18
(2S   1)2.
Consequently we get W T  W  =  1
2
( tTf   tTh )2 < 0: Moving from tax competition to
tax harmonization is thus welfare improving.
A.2 Minimum tax
The impact on tax revenues
We assume that the tax rates set by the jurisdictions are now bounded from below
by  such that  2  tTh ; tTf  : In that we follow Kanbur and Keen (1993). The small
country will set eth =  since it is its best choice. The large country chooses its best
reply etf = 2 + 1 S2 : It follows ex = 12(1 + S   ): The tax income for each country is
respectively eBh = 12(1 + S   ) and eBf = 14 (   S + 1)2. The aggregate tax income is
then eB = 1
4
(S2   2S + 4    2 + 1) :
It is then easy to check that for  > tTh we have eBh > BTh and eBf > BTf . It follows that
imposing a minimum tax rate to the competing jurisdictions is a Pareto-improvement
in tax revenue. This result is reminiscent of Kanbur and Keen (1993).
The impact on social welfare
The social welfare resulting from a minimum tax bound  2  tTh ; tTf  equals fW =
q  1
2
(1
2
  1
2
   1
2
S)2: Hence, fW  W T = 1
72
(S   3 + 1) (7S + 3   5) : Since  2  tTh ; tTf 
it is straightforward to show that W () > W T : Consequently, a minimum tax which
lying between the non-cooperative equilibrium tax rates is welfare improving. This
result is in line with Kanbur and Keen (1993).
B Claims and their proofs
Claim 1. With  2 [th; tf ], we always have Bh > Boh.
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Proof. We recall that the tax revenue of country h resulting from tax and infrastruc-
ture competition is Bh =
7
225
(3S   3a+ 4)2 with S + 1
2
< a < 1 + S < S + 4
3
. The
non-cooperative equilibrium tax rates are th =
4 3a+3S
5
and tf =
1+3a 3S
5
. In addi-
tion, Boh = (1   a + S)   58 2 is positive only if 0 <  < 8(1 a+S)5 . It is easy to
check that Boh reaches its maximum at b = 4(1 a+S)5 . Furthermore, Boh is decreasing
in  for  2 [b ; tf ]. Since b   th =  a S5 < 0; it follows that Boh decreases in  for
 2 [th; tf ] and reaches its maximum at th. Therefore, to prove the claim, we only need
to show that Bh > B
o
h(t

h). It is straightforward to show that B
o
h(t

h) = t

h
4 5a+5S
8
: Thus,
Bh  Boh(th) = t

h
360
(44 + 57a  57S) > 0. That finishes the proof.
Claim 2. There is Bf < Bof for  2 [th; tf ].
Proof. We know that Bof =
1
8
(2a   2S + )2 and Bf = 7225 (3S   3a  1)2. Given
that Bof is increasing in  for  2 [th; tf ], the claim is proved if the inequality Bof > Bf
holds for the minimum value of Bof which equals B
o
f (t

h) =
1
8
 
4+7a 7S
5
2. After straight-
forward calculations, we get Bof (t

h)  Bf = 12572 [88 + 56 3(a  S)  63(a  S)2] with
S + 1
2
< a < 1 + S, which implies, 1
2
< a  S < 1.
If we set x = a   S, we can write Bof (th)   Bf as a second order polynomial in x,
which equals f(x) =  63x2 + 56  3x + 88 with 1
2
< x < 1 . The function f(x) is
concave and it is easy to check that it is positively signed for x 2  1
2
; 1

. Consequently,
Bof (t

h) Bf > 0 for all a 2
 
1
2
+ S; 1 + S

and Bf < B
o
f for  2 [th; tf ].
Claim 3. If a 2

1
2
+ S; 5
p
3 3
9
+ S

and  2 (th; ) it follows that B > Bo:
Proof. Set x = a   S and let  = 1   1
2
x  
q
13x2
100
+ 3x
25
  13
225
and  = 1   1
2
x +q
13x2
100
+ 3x
25
  13
225
be the solutions of 	() = B Bo = 0: The function 	() is negative
for  2 ( ; ), since it is convex in  . It can further be checked that  > th if 12 < x <
5
p
3 3
9
 
< 6
7

and that tf <  if
1
2
< x < 6
7
. It follows that 	() > 0 for  2 (th; ) which
is only possible for x 2

1
2
; 5
p
3 3
9

, or for a 2

1
2
+ S; 5
p
3 3
9
+ S

:
Claim 4. W o > W  for  2 [th;minfm; tfg] with m = 2(1  a+ S) and 12 + S < a <
28
6
7
+ S.
Proof. It is convenient to show that W o is strictly concave in  and reaches its
maximum at + = 2
3
. Thus, the minimum of W o can only be attained at one of the two
boundaries, th or minftf ; mg. Now we determine the minimum value of W o: First, it
is easy to show that W o(th) W o(tf ) =  
tf th
8
< 0 and so W o(tf ) > W
o(th). It follows
that W o(th) = inf W
o if tf < m. If m < t

f , we consider the cases m < 
+ and + <
m < t

f . Because W
o is strictly concave and m > th, we must have W
o(m) > W
o(th)
if m < + and since W o(tf ) > W
o(th), we must have W
o(th) < W
o(tf ) < W
o(m), if
+ < m < t

f . In any case, W
o reaches its minimum at th.
We now prove that the minimum value of W o is above W . For that purpose it
is sufficient to compare W o(th) with W
. Direct calculation leads to W o(th)   W  =
1
2

x2
4
+ 3x
5
  11
45

; 8x 2 1
2
; 6
7

with x = a   S. It is easy to see that the polynomial f(x)
= x
2
4
+ 3x
5
  11
45
is convex in x and reaches its minimum at x =  6
5
:The function f(x) is
thus increasing in ( 6
5
;1). Noticing that f(0) =  11
45
and f(1
2
) = 1
8
> 0 it follows that
f(x) > 0 for x 2 1
2
; 6
7

. In other words W o(th) > W
, and thus we prove that W o> W 
for all  2 [th;minftf ; mg] and 12 + S < a < 67 + S: We finish the proof.
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